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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 001717

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, AND EUR FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MASS](#) [AJ](#) [AM](#) [OSCE](#)

SUBJECT: DETAILS OF SHOOTING INCIDENT ON LINE OF CONTACT

REF: BAKU 1415

Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4(b,d).

SUMMARY

[11.](#) (C) The September 20 shooting incident on the line of contact seemed clearly directed to disrupt N-K negotiations and will certainly be raised at the OSCE Permanent Council. While there is no way to determine which side fired, the round -- which impacted about 20 meters from an international monitor -- came from the direction of Azeri lines. This was the message delivered by OSCE Monitor Peter Keay in a meeting with CDA on September 23. A confidential report signed by OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk of the shooting (text below) will be delivered in the coming days to the OSCE Permanent Council. Monitoring is suspended until Kasprzyk has an opportunity to raise the incident with both sides together with Minsk Group co-chairs. End Summary.

OSCE MONITOR CONFIRMS SEPTEMBER 20 SMALL ARMS FIRE

[12.](#) (C) Peter Keay, a UK national member of the OSCE group led by Special Rep Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, met with the CDA at the Embassy on September 23 and described events in detail. Keay took part in the monitoring of the Line of Contact (LOC) between N-K Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on September 20 and was the first monitor out of the trench on the N-K side. Amb. Kasprzyk was leading the party from the Azerbaijan side of the LOC. The trench lines were about 1300 meters apart at the point of monitoring.

[13.](#) (C) The monitoring event had been proceeding according to standard procedure. Positive contact had been made with commanders of both sides and both sides provided assurances that there would be no incidents. Monitoring groups were in contact with hand-held radios. Keay emerged from the trench on the N-K side of the LOC with the local N-K forces commander. He could see Amb. Kasprzyk's monitoring party on the Azerbaijan side of the LOC and made positive contact as usual, by waving an OSCE flag. He was in discussion with the local N-K commander, who was directing his attention to new trenches extending toward the N-K lines from the Azerbaijan side when he saw a round impact the dust about 20 - 30 meters away from his position. He then heard the sound of a weapon discharge which he described as the distinctive sound of a 7.62 mm Kalashnikov rifle.

[14.](#) (C) Keay said that although the round came from the direction of the Azerbaijan side, the trenches at that point of the LOC are so serpentine that it would be impossible to determine with certainty which side fired. He immediately returned to the trench on the N-K side and contacted Amb. Kasprzyk, who discontinued the monitoring event and issued a statement. (See para 6 below.)

[15.](#) (C) Keay said Amb Kasprzyk intends to raise the issue with both sides at an upcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers together with the Minsk Group co-chairs. Keay passed us a copy of a confidential report prepared by the group which would be distributed in Vienna next week (see para 7 below). Keay speculated that while it is remotely possible that the round was fired by accident, it was most likely an attempt to "throw a spanner in the works of negotiations" just at a point where they appear most promising. He asserted that tension along the LoC seemed to be growing as the negotiators became more optimistic. "It's very, very tense right now," he said.

OSCE PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING SHOOTING INCIDENT

[16.](#) (U) Begin text of Kasprzyk statement issued immediately after shooting incident:

At approximately 1157 hrs during the course of the Monitoring, following security guarantees issued by both

sides, after both monitoring teams were out of their trenches on the open ground and visual contact between them had been established, a single shot was heard by both teams. A field assistant participating on the territory controlled by Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) armed forces confirmed what appeared to be a bullet strike the ground 20-30 meters in front and slightly to the left of his position approximately one second prior to the report. The Monitoring party immediately took cover in the trenches.

End Text

OSCE REPORT NO. 147 ON MONITORING THE LINE OF CONTACT

17. (C) Begin text of Text of "official incident report."
(Note internal paragraph markings and OSCE classification.)

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
The Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on
the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

Report No. 147 on Monitoring on the Line of Contact 20
September 2005

1 Basic Data on the Monitoring

1.1 Introductory remarks

The Monitoring on the Line of Contact (LoC) was initiated by the Personal Representative (PR) of the Cia. The PR requested the Monitoring to be held in the southern part of the LoC on 20 September 2005, in the vicinity of the village of Karakhanbeyli in Fizuli Region. The last Monitoring in this area took place on 01 June 2005 (MR 141) and on this exact spot on 23 November 2004 (MR 130). The aim of the Monitoring was to verify the current situation along this part of the LoC.

1.2 Monitoring Requests and Security Guarantees

On 12 September 2005, a Field Assistant, on behalf of the PR, presented a Monitoring Request to the Azerbaijani MFA. The Azerbaijani side responded positively on 19 September and offered security guarantees in their response. A corresponding request was presented to the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) authorities on 13 September 2005. The NK side responded positively on 19 September and also offered security guarantees in their response.

1.3 Place of the Monitoring

The site of the Monitoring on the LOC was approximately 5 km north-east of the village of Karakhanbeyli.

The positions of the Teams at the Monitoring site in the LOC were:

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 18 minutes
(from map)

Team No.2 (NK side)
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 17 minutes

The Teams were approximately 1300m apart.

1.4 Personnel

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)

OSCE Monitoring Team
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland), Personal Representative
of the Cio
Miroslav Vymetal, Field Assistant (Czech Republic)
Maj Konstantinos Theodoropoulos HLPG, (Greece)

Escort Personnel

10. Ismayil-Zade, MFA
Capt R. Kerimov, MoD
Lt Col A. Seyidov, regional commander Lt Col A. Aslamov,
local commander

Team No.2 (NK side)
OSCE Monitoring Team
Lt Col Imre Palatinus, Office Coordinator (Hungary)
Peter Keay, Field Assistant (UK)

12. Detailed account of the Monitoring

2.1 Course of the Monitoring

The two Teams traveled in a total of five clearly marked OSCE vehicles, three on the NK and two on the Azerbaijani side. General visibility was good, up to 15 kilometres and weather conditions were good. After security guarantees for crossing open ground were given, the Teams moved to their covered positions. After further security guarantees for the Monitoring were exchanged, the Teams moved forward on foot to the Observation sites. Once both were in position they climbed out of the trenches with raised OSCE flags and established visual contact. The distance between Teams was 1300m. Approximately four minutes after visual contact was established a single shot was heard on both sides (at a distance of 600-800 meters slightly to the left of the Observation site on the NK front lines). The Monitoring party immediately took cover in the trenches. A Field Assistant from Team 2 confirmed what appeared to be a bullet strike the ground 20-30 metres in front and slightly to the left of his position approximately one second prior to the report. Following VHF radio communication between the Teams, the decision to halt the Monitoring was taken. All personnel returned to their vehicles and left the area.

Team 1

Team 1 was given a briefing in Goradiz by the Head of the Local Executive and the regional and local military commanders. After the briefing, the two vehicles of Team 1, escorted by two vehicles from the Azerbaijani side, moved to a point approximately 3 km east of the Monitoring Site where they stopped to exchange security guarantees before crossing open ground and to confirm the exact locations for the Observation sites. Team 1 then traveled to a covered position at the Monitoring Site where further security guarantees for the Monitoring were exchanged. After this, Team 1 moved approximately 250 metres on foot to its Observation site, and with an OSCE flag raised climbed above ground out of the trenches, from where visual contact was established with Team 12. After a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the trenches.

Team 2

Team 2 met with the local military commanders on the road north of Fizuli and was given a briefing on the situation on the LOC. After the briefing, the three vehicles of Team 2, escorted by two vehicles from the NK side moved to a point approximately 2 km north of Karakhanbey Ii where they stopped to exchange security guarantees before crossing open ground and to confirm the exact locations for the Observation sites. Team 2 then traveled to a covered position at the Monitoring Site where further security guarantees for the Monitoring were exchanged. After this, Team 2 moved approximately 50 metres on foot to its Observation site, and with an OSCE flag raised climbed above ground out of the trenches, from where visual contact was immediately established with Team 1. After a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the trenches. All members of the Team 2 were able to agree on the direction and approximate distance of the shot.

2.2 Information obtained during Monitoring as stated by the respective Parties

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)

Cease-fire violations

The regional commander confirmed information given by Head of the Local Executive that cease-fire violations are common and the local population close to the LOC lives under the permanent threat of shooting. He reported that 26 cease-fire violations, took place on this part of the LOC since the Monitoring on 1 June 2005. In some cases the Azerbaijani side opened returned fire. As a result of sniper fire one Azerbaijani soldier was reported to have been killed on 28 July 2005. Another incident was reported to have taken place on 13 August when one soldier was killed while fetching water and another injured when trying to remove the body.

Other Military Information

The regional commander stated that the NK side is constantly improving its positions by building fortified positions at intervals of 300-350 metres. He stated that this is in order to improve control over the adjacent territory. Such positions were pointed out to the Team while moving to the Observation site. He also added that tracer rounds are used to set fire to dry grass in no-man's land and as a result the harvest close to the LOC is under threat.

Mines

No mine related incidents were reported in this sector. The regional commander stated that 12 mine explosions were heard during the fire in no-man's land on 1-2 September.

Team No.2 (NK side):

Cease-fire violations

Team 2 was given a list of three cease-fire violations on the whole of the LOC since the last Monitoring on 08 September 2005. Two of the violations were said to have taken place in the Hadrut Sector and one in the Mardakert Agdere Sector. No injuries were reported.

The local commander informed the Team that the situation on the LOC is relatively calm and stable, with a reduced number of reported cease-fire violations.

Mines

No mine incidents were reported on the NK side, but Maj M. Arushunyan mentioned that on five occasions since the last Monitoring, mine explosions had been heard on the Azerbaijani side.

13. Conclusions

- The fact that the Monitoring was halted due to a shot being fired towards OSCE monitoring Team brings into question the security of the Teams. The exchange of guarantees prior to Monitorings is meant to ensure the safety of OSCE personnel. It is of paramount importance that escort personnel, including local and regional commanders, should ensure that every measure possible is taken to guarantee the safety and security of OSCE personnel also by strengthening the discipline among troops.

- It was not possible for the Teams to determine the side from which the shot came due to the terrain and the nature of the front lines.

- Parties should promptly investigate the incident and submit relevant reports.

- The tension on the LOC observed at the last Monitoring remains high. The increased number of casualties is a cause for concern and should be addressed.

ANDRZEJ KASPRZYK
Personal Representative of the CiO

End text.
GODFREY